Nyāya न्याय
- Big question
- How do we know anything for sure?
- Key text
- Nyāya Sūtra (Gautama)
- One-line idea
- Logic and valid means of knowledge
How do we know anything for sure? What is the world made of? What is ultimately real? Six classical schools started from six different questions.
If you could ask the universe one question, would it be "what is real?", "how do I know?" or "how do I live?"
Indian philosophy is often presented as one voice. In fact it was a long, lively argument. Schools wrote short, dense root texts called sūtras, and then commentators spent centuries explaining, defending and attacking them.
Six schools came to be grouped together as the classical "orthodox" systems. Each one has a big question it cares about most, a key text, and a central idea. The table below lines them up on the same three rows so you can compare them at a glance.
| Row | Nyāyaन्याय | Vaiśeṣikaवैशेषिक | Sāṃkhyaसांख्य | Yogaयोग | Mīmāṃsāमीमांसा | Vedāntaवेदान्त |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Big question | How do we know anything for sure? | What is the world made of? | How do spirit and matter relate? | How do we still the mind? | How should the Vedas be understood and acted on? | What is ultimate reality? |
| Key text | Nyāya Sūtra (Gautama) | Vaiśeṣika Sūtra (Kaṇāda) | Sāṃkhya Kārikā (Īśvarakṛṣṇa) | Yoga Sūtra (Patañjali) | Mīmāṃsā Sūtra (Jaimini) | Brahma Sūtra (Bādarāyaṇa) |
| One-line idea | Logic and valid means of knowledge | Categories and atoms | Puruṣa (consciousness) and prakṛti (matter) | Discipline of mind and body | Ritual action and interpretation | Brahman; several sub-schools (Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita) |
The six are traditionally grouped into three pairs that share a lot of ground: Nyāya with Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya with Yoga, and Mīmāṃsā with Vedānta.1 Within each pair, one school tends to supply the theory and the other the method, or one focuses on knowledge and the other on the world.
The pairing is a teaching convenience, not a family tree. Schools borrowed from and argued with each other, and with Buddhist and Jain thinkers, across every pair.
These six are called āstika because they accept the authority of the Vedas. Buddhist, Jain and Cārvāka (materialist) schools are called nāstika because they do not.1
The labels describe a position on Vedic authority, not a ranking. The nāstika schools are just as much part of India's philosophical conversation, and many of the sharpest arguments in the classical texts are between the two sides.
Reject Vedic authority and argue there is no permanent self. Their debates with Nyāya and Vedānta shaped both sides.
Reject Vedic authority and teach that reality can be described from many standpoints at once.
A materialist school that trusted perception above all. Its own texts are mostly lost; we know it largely through its critics.
Vedānta itself split into several sub-schools that disagree on the most basic question of all: how the self relates to ultimate reality. Advaita says the self and Brahman are not two. Viśiṣṭādvaita says the self is real and distinct, yet inseparable from Brahman. Dvaita says they are eternally distinct.2
The argument was never settled, and that's the point. These schools model a way of disagreeing carefully, with rules of evidence and respect for the strongest version of the other side.
The six schools show that questioning is not a modern import. Asking "how do you know that?" sits at the heart of the classical tradition. What would change if public debate today used their rules of evidence?
Vedānta is left out of this poll to keep it to five options; it gets its own entry. Sample counts.
Your grandmother, a judge and a Buddhist monk might all use the word dharma, and mean three different things.
Contrasting views side by side
Concept comparison cards